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During the last decade, there was a debate concerning the true efficacy of antidepressants. Several papers were
published in scientific journals, but many articles were also published in the lay press and the internet both by
medical scientists and academics from other disciplines or representatives of societies or initiatives. The current
paper analyzes the articles authored by three representative opinion makers: one academic in medicine, one
academic in philosophical studies, and a representative of an activists' group against the use of antidepressants.
All three articles share similar gaps in knowledge and understanding of the scientific data and also are driven by
an ‘existential-like’ ideology. In our opinion, these articles have misinterpreted the scientific data, and they as such
may misinform or mislead the general public and policy makers, which could have a potential impact upon public
health. It seems that this line of thought represents another aspect of the stigma attached to people suffering from
mental illness.
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Recently, a number of meta-analytic studies disputed the
clinical usefulness of antidepressants by reporting that
their effect size is small [1-6] and that there is a significant
bias in the publication of antidepressant trials [7]. These
conclusions attracted much attention both by scientists
and by the general public (see list of sites below, Figure 1).
At the center of this debate, there was the meta-analysis
by Kirsch et al. [4] which suggested that antidepressants
fall well below criteria for clinical relevance and that
efficacy reaches clinical relevance only in trials involving
the most severely depressed patients. Kirsch went further
and accused the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as
having an explicit decision to keep this information from
the public and from prescribing physicians [8]. The
Kirsch et al. data set [4] has been re-analyzed by two other
groups [9,10], which independently reported results differ-
ent to those reported by Kirsch et al. The interpretations
also differed.* Correspondence: kfount@med.auth.gr
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Figure 1 The depiction of the debate over the efficacy of antidepressants in high-reputation newspapers.









Furthermore, by ‘overstretching’ the interpretation of
the data, Kirsch also suggested that because they do not
incur drug risks, alternative therapies (e.g., exercise and
psychotherapy) may be a better treatment choice for
depression [8] and went on to author a book under
the title The Emperor's New Drugs: Exploding the
Antidepressant Myth [11].
In this frame, it is indeed peculiar that nobody com-
ments on the finding of another meta-analysis which
suggests that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs) differ from psychotherapy as much as they differ
from placebo (0.28 vs. 0.32) [12].Aim and methods
In this article, we will try to shed light on this issue. An
important problem is that there are many technical de-
tails the average reader who is not a researcher or deeply
involved in the field of mental health will find difficult to
understand and follow. We will try to keep the argu-
ments in a frame accessible to the average reader, and
where necessary, we will provide additional information.
There are a number of articles in relationship to the
Kirsch et al. paper on antidepressants in the lay press,
written by persons established in their field. Three of
them were selected for discussion in the current paper,
as being quite representative. The choice was done
according to the judgment of the authors of the current
paper, and no strict criteria were applied. One (double art-
icle) is from a prominent academic in medicine, the sec-
ond is from an academic outside medicine, and the third
reflects the anti-medication and anti-psychiatric cultural
movement. It is not possible to tackle all the points raised
in these articles; however, some are overwhelmingly prob-
lematic, and they will be mentioned below. Of course, it
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essentially right although ‘overstretched,’ e.g., the issue of
conflict of interest or the problems in the diagnosis and
classification of mental illness and its separation from nor-
mal conditions (e.g., grief). Also, an effort will be made to
clarify the similarities and differences among them and to
delineate their driving ideas.
A medical academic's view
Marcia Angell is a senior lecturer in Social Medicine at
Harvard Medical School and the former editor in chief of
the NEJM. Recently, she wrote two articles in The New
York Review of Books as reviews of Irwin Kirsch's new book
The Emperor's New Drugs: Exploding the Antidepressant
Myth, Robert Whitaker's Anatomy of an Epidemic: Magic
Bullets, Psychiatric Drugs, and the Astonishing Rise of
Mental Illness in America, and Daniel Carlat's Unhinged:
The Trouble With Psychiatry—A Doctor's Revelations About
a Profession in Crisis [13,14].
Dr Angell starts with a review of recent epidemio-
logical data with misleading and false conclusions and
continues to say that ‘nowadays treatment by medical
doctors nearly always means psychoactive drugs. . .. In
fact, most psychiatrists treat only with drugs.’ The truth
is that there are no data to support Dr Angell's claim.
The main argument is explicitly developed in the 5
March 2011 editorial of The New York Times, but still in
the same editorial, it is clearly stated that psychiatrists
earn more if they do psychotherapy while workload is
less. It is well known among clinicians that throughout
the world, private psychiatry is mainly based on psycho-
therapy, applied in a non-specific way. There is a very
simple and obvious reason for this. Although later in her
text, Dr Angell writes that ‘. . .If he sees three patients an
hour for psychopharmacology, he calculates, he earns
about $180 per hour from insurers. In contrast, he
would be able to see only one patient an hour for talk
therapy, for which insurers would pay him less than
$100.’ Most psychiatrists working in the private practice
around the world would do the calculation differently: if
they are paid by the patient, then three patients four times
per month make 12 sessions of psychotherapy vs. only
three for psychopharmacology plus support. Unless one
sees three patients per hour for 8 h every day for 20 days
per month (480 individual patients), then he needs to
utilize psychotherapy to fill the gaps in the appointments.
The same number of 480 sessions is covered with only 40
individual patients under psychotherapy. Note that in
many countries, this cost is out of pocket either
completely or partially, which means the cost is freely
negotiated between the therapist and the patient. It is clear
that in contrast to what Dr Angell says, the psychiatric
profession embraces because of the economic benefits
psychotherapy and not psychopharmacology. On the otherhand, in many countries, doctors are employed by the
health care system and get fixed salaries for a fixed number
of work hours. In this case, they choose psychotherapy
because the workload is smaller as they can be
responsible for one third of visits and a much reduced
number of patients.
At another point, she writes that ‘Carlat does not believe
that psychopharmacology is particularly complicated.’ But
does a therapeutic method need to be ‘complicated’? It
needs to be scientific. Scientific solutions are usually simple
and often accused as being ‘simplistic’; this is a consequence
and misunderstanding of the reductionistic method which
constitutes the basis of the scientific approach. On the
other hand, it is true that most clinicians (especially general
practitioners) utilize psychopharmacotherapy in a simplistic
and not well-informed way; training in biological therapies
is also problematic worldwide and receives much less in
time allocated in comparison to ‘talk’ therapies. In the
authors' opinion, it is one of the oxymora of modern
psychiatry, that is, to invest more on methods of unproven
vs. proven efficacy.
Dr Angell repeats the argument that ‘instead of develop-
ing a drug to treat an abnormality, an abnormality was pos-
tulated to fit a drug.’ This argument has an inherent
circular logic, and thus, it is almost impossible to argue
against it logically, but it keeps emerging again and again in
the writings of many authors. It is one thing to say that the
boundaries of use of a specific medication are artificially
expanded and another thing to say that one ‘invents’ a dis-
ease the drug supposedly cures. This is especially true when
a drug has unpleasant side effects. It is as if one argues that
it is not normal not to have nausea, tremor, headache, or
extrapyramidal signs, and therefore, all people should
receive those medications that cause them as side effects.
One important phrase by Dr Angell is the following:
‘Altogether, there were forty-two trials of the six drugs.
Most of them were negative.’ This is false. Kirsch et al.
received 47 trials from the FDA data, but only 35 (not 42)
of them have data sufficient for analysis. Of course, most
of the studies were not negative. The truth is that only in
one of these 35 studies had been the effect size d in favor
of placebo and was around zero in another five. In all of
the remaining trials, it was above 0.10, and among them,
18 were above 0.30 [4,9,10]. The overall effect size was
0.32 which points to a non-perfect but clear superiority of
the medication vs. placebo [4,9,10,15,16].
The most impressive of all statements follows: ‘even treat-
ments that were not considered to be antidepressants—
such as synthetic thyroid hormone, opiates, sedatives, stim-
ulants, and some herbal remedies—were as effective as
antidepressants in alleviating the symptoms of depression.’
At the end of her article, she concludes that ‘If we knew
that the benefits of psychoactive drugs outweighed their
harms, [and] that would be a strong argument, since there
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illness. But as Kirsch, Whitaker, and Carlat argue convin-
cingly, that expectation may be wrong.’ and that ‘Both psy-
chotherapy and exercise have been shown to be as effective
as drugs for depression, and their effects are longer-lasting.’
These arguments are evidently wrong [12,17,18] although,
of course, different opinions exist [19]. Even according to
Irwin Kirsch, all work through expectancy because they
produce side effects, and thus, they ‘unblind’ the studies. In
this way, the patient suspects that he is receiving an active
drug instead of a placebo, his expectancy increases, and this
boosts improvement. In simple words, this means that
nothing works, and everything is placebo; this is exactly the
opposite from ‘as effective as.’
However, Kirsch's suggestion is far from correct. As what
recent meta-analysis has shown, the antidepressants which
were more effective than others were those with a side-
effect profile similar to placebo [20]. The ‘efficacy’ of non-
antidepressant agents is a well-known artifact because of
the problematic properties of the psychometric scales used
and other methodological problems. For example, the
Hamilton depression scale (HDRS) comprises a mixture of
items; some of which reflect core symptoms of depression,
but most reflect either non-specific symptoms like anxiety
or sleep disorder while others might correspond both to
depressive symptoms and to medication side effects (e.g.,
headache is both part of the anxiety-depressive symptom-
atology and also constitutes as a side effect of many drugs)
[21]. In this frame, benzodiazepines could cause a signifi-
cant improvement of HDRS total score, thus mistakenly
suggesting they possess antidepressant effects. This has
already happened with olanzapine who caused a significant
reduction in the depressive score by improving sleep, agita-
tion, and appetite, but not the core symptoms of depression
in a study on bipolar depression [22]. This is probably one
source of the response in the placebo arm since
patients in that arm often receive benzodiazepines
or other non-antidepressant agents with pronounced
sedative or anxiolytic properties.
Later in her article, Dr Angell wonders whether ‘our
drug-based paradigm of care, in some unforeseen way, be
fueling this modern-day plague?’, and although the argu-
ments are weak, she writes: ‘Whitaker's evidence is
suggestive, if not conclusive (that medication changed the
natural history of mental illness to the worse).’
It is also interesting that Dr Angell puts so much
emphasis on the fact that ‘some (psychiatrists) embraced
the new biological model, some still clung to the Freudian
model, and a few saw mental illness as an essentially sane
response to an insane world.’ This is not true. All over the
world, the training of psychiatry is eclectic; stressing the
fact that there is only one discipline which takes into con-
sideration the developments of very different disciplines.
On the other hand, even if one accepts the argument, itmust be stressed that science was never an issue of voting
or consensus, especially among people without research
or academic background.
Concerning her comments on the development of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth
edition (DSM-V) of the American Psychiatric Association,
she implies some kind of conspiracy theory: ‘These efforts
to enhance the status of psychiatry were undertaken delib-
erately.’ Although criticism of the DSM has some value
(e.g., concerning the validity and the number of diagnostic
categories), again, she overstretches the interpretation of
the situation: ‘DSM-III was almost certainly more “reliable”
than the earlier versions, but reliability is not the same
thing as validity.’ She fails to mention that reliability has the
property to enhance validity by itself. High reliability
implies the existence of some validity; low reliability implies
lack of validity. And again, by overstretching the data, she
suggests: ‘Not only did the DSM become the bible of psych-
iatry, but like the real Bible, it depended a lot on something
akin to revelation. There are no citations of scientific
studies to support its decisions.’ This is clearly wrong;
however, it is beyond the scope of the current article to
review the research support for the DSM classification.
The philosophical-humanistic view
The second article was published in 1 March 2011 by
Louis Menand, who is the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass
professor of English at Harvard University; he has served
as contributing editor at The New York Review of Books
and is the author and editor of several books (his book
The Metaphysical Club was awarded the 2002 Pulitzer
Prize for History and the Francis Parkman Prize from
the Society of American Historians). His article was
published in The New Yorker under the title ‘Can psychiatry
be a science?’ [23] as a comment on two new books, Gary
Greenberg's Manufacturing Depression and Irwin Kirsch's
The Emperor's New Drugs.
Menand writes that the psychiatric literature confuses the
lay reader. He puts emphasis on the lack of consensus
among psychiatrists, discusses the suspicion that the
pharmaceutical industry is cooking the studies, and
mentions that doctors prescribe antidepressants for
patients who are not suffering from depression (eating
disorders, panic attacks, premature ejaculation, and alco-
holism). Clearly, it is more a lay person's view rather than a
scientist in the field of medicine or mental health (which
Louis Menand is not, of course). Throughout medicine,
many medications are useful in the treatment of different
disorders often unrelated (e.g., aspirin treats fever and pain
and prevents atherosclerosis). This without taking into con-
sideration that the mental disorders mentioned by Menand
share clinical features and possibly etiopathogenesis. If
Menand thought that these prescriptions are mistaken, he
should have asked whether there are scientific data
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is beyond the scope of the current article to discuss
this in detail.
When discussing Greenberg's essentially anti-psychiatric
approach, he utilizes an antiquated medical model which
suggests a specific (single) cause and (direct) effect as well
as a clear and qualitative boundary between health and
disease. He makes this clear when he comments on the
way both medicine and lay people deal with gastroesopha-
geal reflux disease or ‘heartburn.’ He goes on to discuss
depression in the frame of his medical model and won-
ders: ‘A fever is not a disease; it's a symptom of disease,
and the disease, not the symptom, is what medicine seeks
to cure. Is depression—insomnia, irritability, lack of
energy, loss of libido, and so on—like a fever or like a
disease? Do patients complain of these symptoms because
they have contracted the neurological equivalent of an
infection? Or do the accompanying mental states
(thoughts that my existence is pointless, nobody loves me,
etc.) have real meaning?’ Apart from the technical detail
that fever is a sign and not a symptom, the truth is that
pneumonia is a disease which can manifest alone or as the
complication of other diseases, e.g., of lung cancer or AIDS.
Infections might be also a side effect, e.g., of medication
given to transplantation patients. The model he has in mind
is too antiquated and too simplistic, but it reflects the lay
person's or the non-expert's view of the issue. The problem
is that this approach is misleading.
However, surprisingly, Menand notes by utilizing com-
mon sense: ‘Kirsch's conclusion is that antidepressants are
just fancy placebos. Obviously, this is not what the individ-
ual tests showed. If they had, then none of the drugs
tested would have received approval.’ Also, at another
point, he says ‘for patients with very severe depression, the
benefit of medications over placebo is substantial—which
suggests that antidepressants do affect mood through
brain chemistry. The mystery remains unsolved.’
He then discusses Kirsch's side-effect argument and
says that ‘Kirsch has an answer: Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT). He says it really works.’ As already
mentioned, Kirsch's theory suggests that nothing works
and everything is some kind of placebo. At another point,
he says ‘Depressed patients in psychotherapy do no better
or worse than depressed patients on medication.’ It is clear
that he is not aware of the relevant literature [12,17,18].
Menand also mentions studies from 1949 suggesting low
reliability of psychiatric diagnosis and some embarrassing
political issues in the development of DSM (homosexuality,
PTSD, self-defeating personality). Although these are real
and important issues, they are discussed out of their frame
with a strong tendency to over-generalize.
However, the most important part of his article is
when he discusses what he believes is the real issue.
Concerning existential problems and depression, he says‘It's not even a problem that we should want science to
solve for us.’ He discusses the bio-psycho-social model
of mental disorders [24-27] by adding that ‘they have
moral significance, since they involve us in matters such
as personal agency and responsibility, social norms and
values, and character, and these all vary as cultures vary.’
He continued that ‘The decision to handle mental condi-
tions biologically is as moral a decision as any other. . ..
Some people feel an instinctive aversion to treating
psychological states with pills, but no one would think it
inappropriate to advise a depressed or anxious person to
try exercise or meditation.’
He then finishes his article with the phrase ‘. . .we don't
want to be the kind of person who does not experience
profound sorrow when someone we love dies? Questions
like these are the reason we have literature and philosophy.
No science will ever answer them.’
With these phrases, Menand summarizes the issue of
the debate. It is philosophical-ideological. The word
‘want’ is central to this line of thought which in essence
concerns ‘free will.’ According to it, medications suppress
free will. It is not a matter of interpreting the data at all.
Maybe one should encourage intellectuals interested in the
free-will issue and mental illness to contact the homeless
people in large cities. A significant number of them have a
history of anxiety and depressive disorders that led them to
the abuse of alcohol and other drugs and eventually led
them to downfall.
The ideological anti-psychiatric view
The third article was published on 27 February 2008,
just after the Kirsch et al. meta-analysis was published,
by Ann Blake Tracy, executive director of the International
Coalition for Drug Awareness under the title ‘Has
AntiDepressant Myth Bubble Burst?’ [28]. In this article,
the British newspaper The Guardian is cited [29]. The
article is a patchwork of issues and ideas directly or indi-
rectly related to the antidepressant debate. It announces
that ‘antidepressants have been all hype with no beneficial
results for two decades. Along with that release, the British
government announced that $335 Million would be allotted
to train 3600 new talk therapists to help those suffering
depression.’Although this announcement was true, the
authors of the current article did not manage to
verify that it was related to a perceived antidepressant
inadequacy by the British government.
Ann Blake Tracy then argues that antidepressants are
similar to PCP or LSD by citing the study which suggested
a therapeutic efficacy of ketamine in the treatment-resistant
depression [30].
The rest of the article mentions parts of her 13
September 2004 testimony to the FDA where she said
‘Can you remember two decades ago when depressed
people used to slip away quietly to kill themselves rather
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they do while taking SSRI antidepressants?’ At another
point, she said ‘These are extremely dangerous drugs that
should be banned as similar drugs have been banned in
the past.’ In the same testimony, it is interesting how she
argues about her scientific opinion on antidepressants: ‘All
of these drugs produce dreaming during periods of wake-
fulness.’ Then, after connecting antidepressants with
induction of manic symptoms (which although not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, it is something most clinicians
and researchers would accept), she describes what she
thinks manic symptoms are: pyromania, kleptomania,
dipsomania, nymphomania, and erotomania! Clearly this
is closer to the eighteenth and early nineteenth century
definition of mania as partial insanity than to modern
understanding of mood disorders. Also, ‘Anyone who has
witnessed someone in insulin shock would see the striking
similarity to a violent reaction to an antidepressant.’ She
also testified that ‘Child sex abuse has increased dramatic-
ally with even female teachers going manic on these drugs
and seducing students.’
Discussion
At the end of the day, the conclusion of all scientific data
published so far suggests that antidepressants are effective
and they treat depression; they do not make humanity
happier. This is a key point that all the above-mentioned
three articles miss. According to the most reserved,
skeptical, and critical meta-analysis, antidepressants might
not constitute the perfect silver bullet but are clearly super-
ior to placebo, and their efficacy is superior to many
established therapies of other specialties of medicine (e.g.,
cardiology and cardiosurgery) in terms of NNT [4,20,31].
They are also clearly superior to any psychotherapy when
rigorous scientific methods are used for the comparison
[12]. Apart from these meta-analyses, it is important to be
cautious when interpreting the results of a meta-analytic
study [32]. However, like any medication, their use needs to
be cautious. Side effects, including the induction of the
opposite pole in bipolar patients, even the induction of
suicidality in specific populations, make necessary that
antidepressants should be prescribed by trained physicians.
The status of psychiatry in medicine is highly complex.
Even more complex is the way scientists outside mental
health regard psychiatry. This seems to depend on each
person's individual discipline and is probably influenced
by ideological or religious aspects. Since psychiatry has
limited exposure with publication of articles in general
scientific journals, it is highly unlikely that the scientists'
or even health professionals' opinion significantly differs
from that of lay people, simply because they are not
informed on the advances in the field of mental health.
A side effect of this limited exposure is that the debate
on the modern face of psychiatry is essentially limitedwithin psychiatry itself. In this debate, ‘hard science’ plays
little role since the majority of psychiatrists and their train-
ing are oriented toward traditional psychosocial and ‘talk
therapies.’ People outside psychiatry see that ‘psychiatrists
disagree,’ and this is clearly reflected in the three articles
reviewed here. The fact that it is essential as an argument
even in the article by Marcia Angell reflects this limited
exposure of psychiatry as a scientific discipline and
part of medicine in highly reputable scientific and
medical journals.
However, psychiatry is a field of medicine although,
among medical specialties, psychiatry puts the greatest
emphasis on psychosocial and personality determinants
of the illness. When a patient comes to a psychiatrist
with depression, he seeks alleviation of his suffering, and
the physician is doing it to the best of his knowledge,
mostly starting with adequate antidepressant treatment.
This is also corresponding to the ‘free-will’ issue put
forward by Menand, although in a different way. The
patient can always choose not to seek help, although, based
on a number of good information initiatives available, he
should be aware that depression is a treatable disease.
The backbone of Marcia Angell's article is not supported
by the data, not even Kirsch's work. The whole article is
against psychiatry as a scientific medical field, in line with
anti-psychiatric texts. It is similar to the article by Ann
Blake Tracy, although it is more sophisticated in style. This
latter article is based on the author's global impression, and
it is poorly written. Menand is more balanced when dealing
with the scientific reports, accepts that medication works at
least in specific populations, but puts the issue in the frame
of an ‘ethical’ and ‘existential’ dilemma, largely reflecting his
view of human freedom and self-determination. He is
somewhat embarrassed when facing the fact that although
he does not really consider depression to be a health prob-
lem, still medication works, and he resolves it by suggesting
a ‘moral’ maybe ‘omnipotent’ solution. It is a view more or
less expected from an intellectual without expertise in
medicine and psychiatry.
Overall, all articles show biased and incomplete approach
of the issue. Still, they argue fiercely, and the authors show
very much convinced on issues where experts struggle to
interpret research data for years.
A number of arguments and lines of thought underlie
all three articles. All stress that psychiatrists disagree, but in
science, it has never been a matter of voting. They imply a
‘moral’ dilemma when using medication to alleviate mental
symptoms. This is of course not new concerning the suffer-
ing of human beings. The dilemma of pain control in deliv-
ery was a hot issue some decades ago, as women should
give birth in pain. In Genesis 3, it is written in words of the
New International Translation: ‘To the woman He said, “I
will greatly increase your pains in childbearing; with pain
you will give birth to children. Your desire will be for your
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not ruled by anybody and make their choices at the delivery
room: no analgesia, epidural or general anesthesia, or alter-
native methods such as hypnosis or relaxation. The same
applies for the care of the terminally ill patients.
They set aside that morality has nothing to do with
scientific data; they utilize an ideological and culturally
biased interpretation of scientific data in a relativistic
post-modern approach. It seems that prominent scien-
tists, like when they join political parties and ideologies,
frequently load their articles with their scientific prestige,
but not with their scientific knowledge.
Why is this happening? According to Menand, ‘The
critics who say that psychiatry is not really science are
not anti-science themselves. On the contrary: they hold
an exaggerated view of what science, certainly medical
science, and especially the science of mental health, can
be.’ The authors of the current article strongly disagree.
The kind of critique psychiatry faces is inappropriately
negativistic and selective in which aspect of the data
to pick. It seems ideologically and philosophically
fueled and exploits what in the philosophy of science
is obvious: it is easier to argue that something is not
true than it is. This is a side effect of falsificationism;
however, falsificationism uses critique to the benefit
of progress, not as a self-sustained and self-propelled
negativistic and rigid stance and way of viewing things.
Only genetics and Darwinian theory are under similar
ideological fire, maybe because, like psychiatry, both put a
big question mark on the existential question of human
free will and existence.
Indeed, the issue of free will is a hot topic in philosophy
which strives to follow the advances in neuroscience. It is
beyond the scope of the current article to discuss free will;
however, it should be noted that a stream of thought
suggests that ‘unless our choices are ultimately uncaused
they cannot be free’ [33]. This concept makes no sense in
science; when events have ‘no cause,’ they are random, and
free will does not mean one throws dices all the time. Most
‘philosophers’ cannot understand or do not know at all that
the human brain is not a Turing machine; it is a more
complex computational system which does not follow the
rules of informatics science the way we conceive them
today (of course, there are some theoretical proposals like
the ‘quantum computers,’ etc.). However, although un-
sound, these philosophical approaches unfortunately have
an important consequence since they are radically and in-
herently hostile to the concept of mental health and disease
and thus to psychiatry. To some extent, they might tolerate
‘talk therapies,’ but for psychopharmacology, this is
impossible.
It is to be noted that none of the three articles or any
newspaper or media say anything concerning the huge
economical cost of alternative therapies (including mostpsychotherapies), which are culturally and philosophic-
ally accepted and are based on tradition; however, only a
small minority of these techniques has some, but not
complete, support by hard evidence (in sharp contrast to
medication), and even then, their efficacy is lower than
that of medication treatment [17,18] and might not be
better than placebo at all [12]. Also, no mentioning is
made of the fact that general practitioners and not psy-
chiatrists prescribe most antidepressants and treat most
psychiatric patients. Whether they are adequately trained
to do so or not, it is an ongoing debate; however, the
blame for this should not be put on the discipline of
psychiatry.
While authors argue whether depression is a medical
problem and whether and how antidepressants work, they
miss the fact that a number of conditions (e.g., myopia) do
not fulfill their criteria for a medical disorder. It is interest-
ing that similar criticism has been made to the use of
correction glasses, and there are authors suggesting that
they worsen short-sight problems in the long term [34].
This ideological and romantic view of health is not only
embarrassing when facing cosmetic surgery, the use of
viagra, or even preventive medicine aiming at prolonging
life (is there anything more natural than getting older and
die?), but this line of thought is also similar to suggesting
that the use of X-ray examination increased the incidence
of bone fractures or that the use of higher Tesla MRI
equipment increased the incidence of vascular encephalop-
athy and cancer metastasis. In this frame, the demand
posed (directly or indirectly) by Dr. Angell that for one to
be considered as a medical condition (‘disease’) that it
should include abnormal laboratory testing is misleading.
After all, response to medication should be considered to
be a strong biological marker for depression (however, the
whole debate concerns the efficacy of these agents).
There is no better conclusion of the present article than
what is impressively written by Menand: ‘Science, particu-
larly medical science, is not a skyscraper made of Lucite. It
is a field strewn with black boxes. There have been many
medical treatments that worked even though, for a long
time, we didn’t know why they worked—aspirin, for ex-
ample. And drugs have often been used to carve out dis-
eases. Malaria was “discovered” when it was learned that it
responded to quinine. Someone was listening to quinine.’
As long as psychiatry is a neglected field in the med-
ical literature, the gap will be filled by the lay media or
the ‘lay-like’ articles of non-lay authors, with adverse
consequences on public health.
Louis Menanda responds
Even though there are four of them, the authors manage to
completely misinterpret what I wrote. My article was not
anti-science, anti-psychiatry, or anti-psychopharmacology.
On the contrary: it was a defense of psychiatry, including
Fountoulakis et al. Annals of General Psychiatry 2013, 12:11 Page 8 of 9
http://www.annals-general-psychiatry.com/content/12/1/11psychopharmacology, against most of its critics. The au-
thors seem to take offense even at summaries of criticisms
of psychiatry, which is what most of my article consists of. I
was not endorsing the views that I tried to explain. I cer-
tainly don't endorse Kirsch's book, which seems to be the
main target of the authors' animus. And I don't know
where the authors got the idea that I think taking medica-
tion suppresses free will, since I specifically refuted that
supposition. Free will and determinism may be, as the au-
thors say, a ‘hot topic,’ but I have no interest in it.’
Surely the authors would agree that psychiatry is a field
that has undergone unusually drastic and often highly pub-
licized paradigm revisions in the last fifty years, accompan-
ied by an enormous amount of criticism from within the
field. A non-scientist might well feel confused, and might
even wonder whether the present state of knowledge is due
for an overhaul, as well. I was addressing that person. The
authors often use the term ‘ideological’ to discredit argu-
ments that they believe to be unscientific or anti-science.
This is specious. Medicine, like everything else we do, is
practiced within an intellectual context. Trying to under-
stand such contexts is what English professors do.
Endnote
aLouis Menand: Correspondence: Department of English,
Harvard University, 12 Quincy St, Cambridge, MA 02138,
USA; Email: menand@fas.harvard.edu.
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